The United Arab Emirates’ Military Strategy: Bases in Socotra, Abd Al-Kuri, and Mayun in the Context of the Yemeni War

The Socotra Archipelago, located in the Gulf of Aden, 240 kilometers from the Horn of Africa, although it still officially belongs to Yemen, is under the control of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as part of the country’s expansionist agenda in Yemen following the intervention against the Houthi rebels in 2015, with the aim of separating the territory and administering it as its own possession.

In general, the United Arab Emirates’ project to control islands and coastal bases is intrinsically linked to the context of the war in Yemen. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia led a military coalition, of which the UAE was a part, to combat the Houthi rebels and restore the internationally recognized government. However, for the United Arab Emirates, the conflict was also an opportunity for strategic projection in one of the world’s most important maritime routes. The Bab al-Mandab Strait, located between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, is through which approximately 30% of the world’s oil passes. Therefore, the ability to control the islands and ports surrounding this strait allows for dominance over one of the planet’s largest maritime chokepoints.

In 2018, the United Arab Emirates had already established a military base on the island of Socotra. The Yemeni government viewed the action as an unjustified aggression against national sovereignty. The crisis was temporarily resolved through Saudi Arabian mediation, with the formal withdrawal of Emirati troops from the airport and port, though not their complete departure from the island. Starting in 2022, in Bosaso, Puntland, the airport was transformed into a sophisticated military facility managed by the UAE. Satellite images reveal a complex with radar capable of tracking targets over 400 km away, covering the entire Gulf of Aden. On the island of Abd al-Kuri, according to the ISPI (Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale), in early 2024, satellite imagery recorded “increased activity,” including the construction of a runway near the water and the movement of heavy vehicles.

Currently, this scenario is part of a context of geopolitical rupture between the UAE and its regional partners. In late 2025, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) carried out a military takeover of the Yemeni governorates of Hadramaut and Mahra. In response, Saudi Arabia launched a diplomatic and military counteroffensive; by attacking what it described as UAE supply routes, it dissolved the STC and pressured the UAE to announce a complete withdrawal from Yemen. Somalia, for its part, having identified the United Arab Emirates’ role behind Israel’s recognition of Somaliland—a territory located between Somalia and Ethiopia—called for a Saudi military intervention and announced the severing of relations with the UAE. In January 2026, Saudi state television revealed that the UAE had reportedly built a runway on the island of Mayun capable of accommodating Israeli military aircraft, an escalation that, if confirmed, represents Israel’s direct involvement on Yemeni soil in the midst of the conflict with the Houthis.

What has been developed over the course of a decade represents an unprecedented maritime control infrastructure for a Gulf nation. The network of bases facilitates control of this vital stretch of water by the UAE and its allies, enabling an integrated missile defense and intelligence-sharing network. The most critical occupations involve three islands: Mayun (Perim), Socotra, and Berbera. Mayun divides the strait into two distinct channels and directs international traffic along defined routes. Thus, control of this area provides the ability to monitor, intercept, or potentially disrupt traffic along one of the most economically vital maritime routes on the planet. The runway built on Mayun allows for airstrikes against mainland Yemen and the conduct of simultaneous operations in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and nearby East Africa. The occupation took place through a direct military takeover. Native residents of the island, supported by the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces, defeated the Houthis in a violent battle lasting several hours. Dominance of the island provides physical control of the Red Sea’s most critical chokepoint. The island divides the Bab al-Mandab into two channels; thus, whoever controls it decides who passes through.

Socotra, in turn, is the largest island, the most populous, and the one with the greatest concentration of Emirati infrastructure. It is located between the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and East Africa. Beyond its military significance, it is the island that most visibly undermines Yemeni sovereignty: the UAE expanded the island’s only airport, built military bases, installed telecommunications towers, and deployed two signals intelligence systems. The takeover occurred in three phases. First, the UAE provided humanitarian aid following the 2015 cyclones, which served as a gateway. Then, on April 30, 2018, more than 300 soldiers, along with armored vehicles and tanks, took control of the port and airport without authorization from the Yemeni government. Finally, in June 2020, the UAE-allied separatist group, the CTS, assumed full administrative control, consolidating the occupation. For the UAE, controlling chokepoints is essential, and Socotra is the hub that simultaneously connects the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and East Africa. The island was never threatened by the Houthis; the war can be considered merely a pretext.

Berbera, then, can be considered the island with the greatest strategic reach beyond the immediate Yemeni conflict. The UAE airbase was built around a nearly four-kilometer-long Soviet runway—one of the longest in Africa—which Abu Dhabi renovated to accommodate heavy transport and combat aircraft. Without Berbera, the network loses its foothold on the African continent and, with it, the ability to project power both into the interior of Africa and to the southern flank of the strait. Occupied since February 2017 through a negotiated diplomatic agreement, Berbera allows operations on the opposite side of the Bab al-Mandab, support for Yemen via alternative air routes, and the projection of economic influence into the African interior via port and rail.

The internationally recognized Yemeni government has strongly condemned Abu Dhabi’s occupation of the islands. In 2018, the Yemeni prime minister’s office classified the takeover of Socotra as an unjustified attack on Yemen’s sovereignty. The Houthi authority (Sana’a) also denounced the Emirates’ presence as an illegal occupation linked to plans for normalization with Israel. In Somalia, the federal government severed all agreements with the UAE in January 2026, accusing Abu Dhabi of undermining its sovereignty and fomenting internal divisions (such as the recognition of Somaliland). Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, an ally of the UAE in Yemen, worked behind the scenes to stabilize the situation without publicly blaming Abu Dhabi. Shortly after the UAE’s withdrawal, Saudi Arabia took control of Socotra Airport and began operating direct flights to Jeddah, thereby signaling support for the Yemeni government rather than Emirati control.

In January 2026, a diplomatic crisis between the UAE and Saudi Arabia resulted in the withdrawal of UAE troops from Socotra. It is estimated that the Saudi demand to end the UAE’s unilateral actions led Abu Dhabi to cease its operations on the largest island, leaving hundreds of foreign tourists stranded. The suspension of flights and the change in control of the airport—now operating to Jeddah instead of Abu Dhabi—were confirmed, thus indicating that the airport facilities are no longer under Emirati control following the withdrawal. Therefore, there was no direct military defeat, but rather political pressure that forced the UAE to withdraw from Socotra.

The islands in question—Socotra (including Abd al-Kuri, Samhah, and Darsa) and other smaller islands—are internationally recognized as Yemeni territory. Yemeni legislation and official maps consider Socotra and its archipelago to be an integral part of the country. Although the UAE claims to have “leased” Socotra for 99 years, Yemen has denied this agreement and has never relinquished its sovereignty. Currently, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) effectively controls part of these islands, but there is no international recognition of this change. The future of the islands will depend on the resolution of the Yemeni conflict. Analysts suggest that, in the event of a regional ceasefire, the Saudis and Emiratis should evacuate locations such as Socotra and restore Yemeni sovereignty over them. Until then, the official stance remains a return to the control of Yemen’s legitimate government, although the exact outcome depends on peace negotiations and the actions of local actors.