The Current Situation in the Middle East: Understanding the Gulf States’ Stance on the War in Iran

The escalation of conflicts between the United States, Israel, and Iran continues to have tangible effects on the contemporary international scene. Launched in February 2026 and led by Washington and Tel Aviv, Operation “Epic Fury” has, as its primary stated objective, the elimination of threats to international security posed by the Iranian regime. Following the intensification of military offensives, various implications can be interpreted as the result of geopolitical tensions, evident primarily after Iran’s decision to block the Strait of Hormuz—a measure that directly contributed to rising global fuel prices.

Following these offensives, Tehran began leading a series of retaliatory strikes targeting, above all, military and civilian infrastructure in Persian Gulf countries. This strategy aimed to immediately raise the costs of war, causing instability not only at the regional level but also in the global economy. In this context, the presence of U.S. military bases in Gulf countries has turned these nations into direct targets of Iranian actions. Faced with this scenario, Gulf countries now operate in a profoundly altered security environment. Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) now face a difficult crossroads: while seeking to avoid a further escalation of the conflict, they must find ways to deter Iran from new acts of aggression without, however, being perceived as participants in a war effort orchestrated by the United States and Israel. Officials in the region fear that failure on any of these fronts could turn the Gulf into a permanent arena for Iranian retaliation whenever tensions with Washington rise.

Within the Gulf itself, however, there are differences in stance. At one extreme, despite some disagreements, are Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which show a greater willingness to align with the United States against Iran. For them, deterrence is essential to prevent continued attacks against their territories. Officials from the United Arab Emirates, for example, have argued that a simple ceasefire would not be sufficient, and that a more comprehensive resolution is needed to address the full range of Iranian threats, including nuclear capabilities, missiles, drones, and the use of proxy actors.

According to scholar Jeffrey Sachs, however, the Gulf countries made a strategic mistake by allying themselves with the United States and Israel in search of protection. In an interview with RT India, Sachs argues that countries like the United Arab Emirates found themselves in a vulnerable position facing Iranian retaliation in the conflict. The impacts of the alliance with the United States and Israel have negative effects on various sectors of UAE society and the economy, such as the decline in tourism and the bombing of gas infrastructure and desalination plants.

Aiming to reduce dependence on the United States—and also as a way to avoid confrontations with Iran—Gulf countries have been forming alliances with middle powers. This is the case with the pacts signed between the United Arab Emirates and India, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and defense treaties between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Ukraine, specifically aimed at countering threats related to the use of drones. Other countries in the region have prioritized predominantly diplomatic responses. Qatar, for example, has adopted a more assertive stance in the diplomatic arena, explicitly condemning Iran and even expelling Iranian military and security representatives from Doha following attacks on strategic liquefied natural gas facilities. Nevertheless, the leadership maintains that only through diplomacy will it be possible to achieve a lasting resolution to the conflict.

This strategic calculation becomes even more complex given the possibility of an abrupt U.S. withdrawal from the conflict. Such a scenario could leave the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries isolated, while Iran would maintain a low-intensity campaign against targets in the Gulf region, prolonging instability and increasing the risks of new cycles of escalation.

On the other hand, there is also—albeit with low probability—a possibility that Gulf countries might align themselves with Iran’s position. Such a development would depend directly on a significant decline in U.S. military and economic influence over the region, which would lead to a profound reconfiguration of the balance of power dynamics in the Middle East as a whole. From this perspective, certain Gulf monarchies might adopt more pragmatic measures, guided by the pursuit of greater regional stability and the maintenance of security, seeking to preserve their critical infrastructure as the conflict escalates. However, this possible rapprochement does not necessarily imply the granting of unconditional support or the complete political alignment of certain Gulf countries with Iran, but rather constitutes a strategic measure to minimize damage. In this context, the gradual normalization of diplomatic and economic relations with Tehran could be interpreted as a way to reduce the likelihood of serious attacks and ensure greater predictability in a volatile regional environment.

Nevertheless, certain obstacles would prevent the full implementation of a potential alignment strategy. Among these, one can highlight the high economic, military, and technological dependence on the United States exhibited by a considerable number of Gulf countries, which prevents a complete and sudden break from the global power. Furthermore, religious differences between the Shiite Iranian regime and the Sunni majority in the other Gulf states hinder the possibility of rapprochement, as does the region’s history of interstate conflicts.

Although less likely in the short term, the possibility of a strategic realignment of Gulf countries toward Iran cannot be completely ruled out. Such a move would depend, above all, on a significant reconfiguration of the regional balance of power, marked by a potential reduction in U.S. military commitment in the Middle East. In this scenario, the search for minimal security guarantees could lead some Gulf monarchies to adopt more pragmatic stances, prioritizing internal stability and the preservation of their critical infrastructure over traditional alliances. Such an approach would not necessarily imply a formal alliance with Tehran, but rather strategies of accommodation and coexistence. Countries like Oman and Qatar, historically more inclined toward diplomatic mediation, could play a central role in this process, acting as bridges between Iran and the rest of the Gulf. The gradual normalization of diplomatic and economic relations with Tehran could be seen as a way to reduce the likelihood of attacks and ensure greater predictability in a volatile regional environment.

Even so, such a move would face significant structural obstacles. Sectarian differences between predominantly Sunni regimes and Shiite Iran, as well as the history of geopolitical rivalry, limit the depth of any rapprochement. Furthermore, the military and technological dependence of several Gulf countries on the United States makes an abrupt break difficult, making it more likely that they will adopt ambivalent foreign policies that seek to balance multiple poles of power simultaneously.

In parallel, Iran’s heightened activity in the region has strengthened its capacity to project power through networks of indirect influence. In this regard, by supporting political and military groups in countries such as Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, Iraq, and Bahrain, the Iranian regime consolidates an expansion strategy based on non-state actors and asymmetric alliances. This strategy allows Iran to expand its regional reach without necessarily resorting to direct confrontations, reducing costs and increasing its deterrence capability against external adversaries, such as the United States. For example, the strengthening of Hezbollah in Lebanon guarantees Iran a strategic position in the Levant, while in Palestine, support for armed groups such as Hamas expands its relevance in the conflict against Israel. In Yemen, the relationship with the Houthis has directly pressured essential maritime routes, while in Iraq, militias aligned with Tehran influence both security and domestic politics. In Bahrain, sectarian tensions offer Iran opportunities to exert indirect pressure on one of the Gulf’s most vulnerable members.

The possibility of Iran establishing itself as a regional power is thus becoming increasingly plausible, especially if it manages to maintain and expand its network of influence without provoking a decisive military response from its adversaries. Consequently, the Gulf states face the challenge of dealing with a state-level adversary, as well as a diffuse power structure capable of operating simultaneously across multiple territories and redefining the security dynamics in the Middle East.