Panic or Anticipation? Chinese Foreign Policy as a “New Wall” Under Construction

Since 2020, China has implemented a series of measures that, in terms of consistency and scale, are unprecedented since the 1970s. Several documented government actions fall within this scope, such as the development of a program to relocate strategic industries to the interior with the aim of creating a “strategic hinterland”; the launch of major civil defense and urban infrastructure resilience projects; the adoption of measures to strengthen the resilience of the national energy system; and the urgent stockpiling of food and raw materials. China’s actions do not necessarily indicate an intention to initiate a large-scale military conflict, but they certainly demonstrate that the Chinese government considers such a conflict to be highly likely—and perhaps inevitable—around the 2020s or 2030s.

The term “strategic hinterland” was officially adopted by President Xi Jinping during an inspection tour of Sichuan Province in 2023. Xi noted that a fundamental characteristic of the province was its “important and unique position in national development and within the Western Grand Development Strategy.” This status imposes a series of obligations on the province, such as ensuring production, energy supply, the supply chain, and food security. Thus, the Sichuan and Chongqing regions have been tasked with building a national strategy for resources and industry.

In subsequent documents, the “strategic hinterland” was linked more closely to industrial security. In 2024, a resolution adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CPC (Chinese Communist Party) mentioned for the first time the need to “build a strategic hinterland and reserve capacity for key industries.” This phrase has become a fixed expression and refers to enhancing the security of production and the supply chain, establishing a risk prevention and assessment system, relocating key industries to the heart of the country to ensure resilience, and developing the country’s natural resource reserves. These key sectors include integrated circuits, medical equipment, basic and industrial software, and advanced materials.

First, these strategic hinterland development plans aim to expand the capacity of key production lines to quickly shift from peacetime operations to emergency operations. Second, the goal is to develop strategic corridors—such as the Yangtze Golden Waterway, the New Land-Sea Trade Corridor, and routes to Central Asia and Europe—to integrate the country’s inland regions into national and trans-Eurasian transportation networks. Finally, the plans aim to create energy and resource reserves in the strategic hinterland, such as infrastructure for the storage and processing of coal, natural gas, lithium, and rare earth metals.

In addition, Chinese mobilization plans mention the creation of “industrial support bases,” often referring to Guizhou Province, where energy resources, minerals, key equipment, and big data are stored. Another key priority of the Chinese government concerns the review and optimization of the strategic reserve management system, with several laws being enacted for this purpose. The primary objective is to establish a stable, multi-level management model involving the creation of professional emergency response teams, the establishment of standardized command posts, and the standardization of response measures based on the level and type of emergency.

In the technological development plan for the mobilization system, versatility is essential for a successful strategy in cases of emergency or conflict. Inspired by the infrastructural resilience demonstrated during Russia’s Special Military Operation, Chinese cities and provinces have been implementing infrastructure development programs to mobilize China’s economy and air defense, based on modernized technology. The strategy involves enhancing civil defense and the early warning system to promote more integrated urban security, as well as protecting economic facilities critical to China’s security. In this context, one of the few documents available to the public regarding the country’s air defense development—the “Chongqing Plan for the 14th Five-Year Period”—calls for the implementation of a four-tiered protection system: protection of the core, which includes the state apparatus; protection of life, that is, care for the population, whether through medical services or evacuation plans; protection of capabilities, both economic and military; and, finally, operational protection, which encompasses all of its infrastructure.

The new civil defense system must therefore be versatile, so as to allow for the immediate conversion of civilian infrastructure to meet the military or emergency needs of the moment. Many of these systems have already been implemented and are based on an emergency command-and-control communication system, ensuring rapid communication even in cases of partial damage to the infrastructure. The creation of this dual-use infrastructure would facilitate the process of transforming public facilities—such as stadiums and schools—into hospitals and temporary shelters, or even into distribution centers for supplies.

Beyond the realm of infrastructure, between 2024 and 2025, China began a process of adapting its legislation to address emergency situations. The new laws are intended to serve as a form of recognition for soldiers killed in potential conflicts, as in the case of the “Measures for the Recognition of Fallen Heroes,” established in 2025, to honor their service through the maintenance and protection of their memorials, as well as to guarantee the rights of soldiers’ families to government-provided benefits. These cases are to be overseen by the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission and the Ministry of Emergency Management, ensuring a system for faster responses to reports of fatalities on the front lines. In this way, these regulations create a mechanism for processing mass applications for such cases in a systematic and less bureaucratic manner.

As for food security in crisis situations, since the early 2020s, China has been strengthening its requirements for the agro-industrial complex and for local authorities in this regard. Through heavy investments in building self-sufficiency in staple foods, seeds, and agricultural machinery—promoting the replacement of imports of both with domestic products—as well as increasing its production and storage capacity, China has prioritized the protection of arable land, the stable production of grain crops, and the management of national reserves. All of this is supported by the National Food Security Law of 2023, which comprehensively governs the food security system.

The stockpiling and strategic redistribution of these food and fertilizer reserves are also key factors in emergency planning. Some measures even end up aligning with certain long-standing agro-industrial priority policies in China, favoring fertilizer producers, who face fewer restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions compared to other industries.

All of this planning is not arbitrary but rather the result of a series of gradual changes unfolding within the international system that could pose a threat to China’s economic stability—such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the U.S.-Israel war against Iran. Consequently, the pressure on China is only likely to increase, prompting it to prepare for a potential disruption in international trade in food and technological resources should these conflicts escalate or new ones arise. The data already points to an increase in resource stockpiles, as by 2024 China had exceeded 1.8 billion barrels of stored oil, equivalent to 130% of U.S. storage capacity. Furthermore, despite promises to reduce coal consumption after 2026, no significant progress has been observed.

Amid a landscape of uncertainty, the construction of China’s “New Wall” has emerged from a foreign policy that is strongly focused on preparing for any threat posed to it, whether regional—as exemplified by the historical tensions with Taiwan—or global. The Chinese government spares no expense when it comes to developing a resilient fortress that protects its sovereignty even against a possible nuclear conflict, thereby adopting a mobilization policy that prioritizes urban planning, energy, agriculture, and high-tech industries. In addition to ensuring that its territory remains untouched by potential wars, this policy guarantees China the freedom to choose the timing and scope of its participation in international relations.

Written by Nicole Vidal and Luísa Tejo