New Regional Alignments in the Gulf: The Rivalry Between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and Its International Implications

A process of redefining the balance of power in the Middle East began more than a decade before the recent conflict in Gaza and the coup in Syria. One reason for this is the reorientation of U.S. foreign policy toward Asia and a reduction in its military presence in the Middle East, which has led the Arab states of the Persian Gulf—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman—to increasingly step in to fill this regional vacuum. These countries have aligned their domestic development with increasingly assertive foreign policies in virtually all Middle Eastern conflicts, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates serving as the main actors in these developments. Both have undergone extensive economic and social reforms that have been reflected in their international standing, making them key players in conflicts ranging from Eritrea to Ukraine. This has also transformed relations between the countries, as—although they are traditionally allies—the competition stemming from their growing influence has led to divergences in foreign policy.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates share general foreign policy objectives that include containing the threat from Iran, advancing peace with Israel, and also finding a solution to the Palestinian issue and ensuring regional stability to create a fertile environment for investment. However, recent civil wars in the region—in Syria, Sudan, and Yemen—have led the countries to prioritize different national security objectives.

The Syrian War did not involve direct competition between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, but it revealed the divergent evolution of their foreign policies over the course of the decade. At the start of the Arab Spring in 2011, both countries were aligned in their support for the more moderate opposition forces against the Assad regime. But as the conflict unfolded, the United Arab Emirates became increasingly concerned about the rise of radical Islamist groups, especially with the rise of the Islamic State in 2014. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia stepped up its investments and funded even more extremist Salafist groups—such as the Army of Islam—in an attempt to topple Assad. Salafism has historically been supported by the Saudis and opposed by the Emiratis, who reject any form of politicized Islam. Thus, the two countries’ policies have polarized between the UAE’s preference for the stability of the Assad government and Saudi support for groups opposing the Syrian regime

Both countries also play an active role in the Sudanese Civil War, a conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Prior to that, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were involved in the ouster of dictator Omar al-Bashir in Sudan and, subsequently, in promoting the military at the expense of a civilian government. The United Arab Emirates and the RSF share a historical relationship, including cooperation in other regional wars. The UAE’s objectives in supporting the RSF include establishing its position in a country that is strategically important to its economy and concerns about the possibility of an unstable future under Islamic rule.

The differences between the UAE and Saudi Arabia center on their support for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The UAE harbors distrust toward the SAF’s leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, preferring that General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, leader of the RSF, defeat him and take over the government. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has close ties with both sides of the conflict and is increasingly acting as a mediator. However, by supporting the RSF, the UAE inevitably thwarts the Saudi vision for Sudan. By enhancing the RSF’s military capabilities, the UAE hinders the SAF’s operations and contributes to the prolongation of the fighting within Sudan.

Currently, Yemen is the main flashpoint in the rivalry between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Initially, the two countries shared common goals: to counter Iran and ensure Yemen’s security against the Houthis. However, for Saudi Arabia, the latter goal is essentially existential, as an anti-Saudi neighbor on its borders would pose a serious risk. This concern is not shared by the UAE, which does not share a land border with Yemen. Thus, although both countries seek regional stability, it is Saudi Arabia that has the most to lose from an unstable Yemen.

Furthermore, even though both countries supported anti-Houthi groups, these very groups were in conflict with one another, leading to a rift between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The UAE supports the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which advocates for the establishment of a “sovereign and independent federal state” in southern Yemen. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, supports the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah), an Islamic party with views that differ significantly from those of the STC. The UAE considers Islah to be affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, a group it perceives as a potential threat, while Saudi Arabia opposes the southern separatist movement and the prospect of a divided Yemen, as advocated by the STC.

As the rivalry intensifies, concerns are increasingly reverberating throughout the Middle East, but particularly among the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman—given the central role of the alliance between the UAE and Saudi Arabia in maintaining stability in the Persian Gulf. As two of the region’s main centers of energy power, the differences—manifested in support for opposing sides in regional conflicts, conflicting energy strategies, and competition for global investments—have the potential to define the balance of power among these countries.

Since the UAE decided to leave OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) effective May of this year, a clear message has been sent to Saudi Arabia, which has historically held a dominant voice within the organization: the UAE rejects the Saudi-led system. The rift in the partnership has even more severe repercussions given the current escalation of tensions involving Israel and Iran in the region, since, in times of crisis, the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s policies would traditionally have aligned to serve as a counterweight to these conflicts. However, the deterioration in relations is leading these countries to realign with other regional powers that do not always seek the same stability, thereby exacerbating the ongoing hostile environment.

Cooperation between the UAE and Israel regarding Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December 2025, for example, reveals the Emirates’ crucial role in establishing Israel’s economic and military presence in the Horn of Africa, implying greater influence by these countries over the Red Sea. Taking advantage of this fact and Israel’s growing unpopularity throughout the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is constructing a narrative opposed to this alliance, uniting regional partners against the UAE, one of which is Egypt. This is occurring as tensions escalate and the UAE-Israel alliance comes to include Ethiopia as well, forming a triangle of cooperation that runs counter to Egyptian interests, given the ongoing dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia over control of the Nile River’s waters.

Although they share similarities regarding their monarchical political systems, the Saudis believe that the UAE does not accept the dominant role Saudi Arabia has played in establishing a stable system of Arab monarchies, viewing the Emirates’ stance as responsible for fueling tensions that it should be containing. At the same time, the UAE believes that Saudi Arabia harbors a certain degree of contempt for the Emirates, underestimating its economic influence in the region and its growing role and identity, independent of the GCC.

The antagonism between these two regional powers goes beyond historical economic competition, even though the UAE has long been regarded as the center of power in the Persian Gulf, far ahead of Saudi Arabia’s development, which is now striving to catch up. The rivalry is also seen as deeply rooted in the political objectives of each country and in their approach to Islamic political movements that influence the regional order. Even though Saudi Arabia typically does not tolerate these movements, it has shown itself to be open to working with them in cases where other alternatives prove unfeasible. Meanwhile, the UAE has sought to eradicate these movements in the region at all costs, which often involves aligning with more hostile and unsavory local partners.

Threats to the GCC’s regional integration system have led to a situation that now depends on mediation by the organization’s other members, in an effort to minimize the rivalry between the Saudis and the Emiratis. To ensure the restoration of regional order and prevent a full-scale rupture—such as the one that occurred in 2017, triggered by Qatar amid accusations of supporting terrorist groups at the time—it is not enough for Western allies like the U.S. to intervene, given that this was insufficient during the previous crisis.

A joint strategy between the United States and its Gulf partners would be ideal in light of the current tensions involving Iran, as greater divisions and disagreements in the region could create opportunities that the Iranian government would not hesitate to exploit. The West’s role, therefore, is simply to reinforce the position of GCC leaders, since a rapprochement between the UAE and Saudi Arabia would serve mutual interests ranging from energy and technology to attracting investors who boost tourism and local business, transforming competition into cooperation and prosperity.