Xi Jinping's Measures Against Chinese Generals

Over the past few years, the Chinese government has intensified measures within the Armed Forces, targeting high-ranking officers linked to the Central Military Commission, the highest military command body in the People's Republic of China. Among the actions taken were the dismissal from strategic positions, the suspension of duties, and the opening of investigations for “serious disciplinary violations,” a formulation usually associated with accusations of corruption. The international press reported the removal of senior commanders linked to the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force and sensitive sectors of arms procurement, signaling a significant reach of the measures at the core of the Chinese military structure.

In addition to administrative dismissals, party officials announced investigations conducted by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the body responsible for internal oversight of the Chinese Communist Party. In some cases, military lawmakers had their mandates revoked in the National People's Congress, a step that often precedes formal criminal proceedings. Observers point out that the comprehensive nature of the measures —focusing on strategic areas such as missiles, logistics, and technological development— evidences direct intervention by the central leadership in the reorganization of the military leadership, with possible impacts on the chain of command and the process of modernizing the armed forces. 

The official justification presented by authorities and state media outlets frames the measures as part of an ongoing campaign to combat corruption and preserve party discipline in the armed forces. According to statements released by state agencies, the investigations aim to protect the institutional integrity of the People's Liberation Army and ensure that officers strictly comply with Party guidelines. The government's discourse maintains that corrupt practices compromise operational efficiency, divert strategic resources, and weaken national security.

However, analyses by international research centers emphasize that the anti-corruption narrative also serves a political function: to reinforce the armed forces' absolute loyalty to the Communist Party and the central leadership. Chinese political and institutional tradition establishes that “the Party commands the gun,” and not the other way around—a principle reiterated by Xi since the beginning of his administration. In this context, recent measures are interpreted not only as disciplinary actions, but as instruments for consolidating political control and reaffirming the leadership's authority over a historically sensitive sector of the state apparatus.

Since Mao Zedong, there has not been such a high degree of subordination among generals, so Xi Jinping's recent decisions have given him virtually unchallenged control over the armed forces. The legacy of Yan'an, remembered by Xi during the Chinese New Year celebrations, dates back to the consolidation of the Chinese Communist Party and the subjugation of the People's Liberation Army to party institutions, based on the understanding that the autonomy of military commanders is conditional on the interests of the party. Generals, despite leading the troops, must preserve their loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party and contribute to the perpetuation of its state authority.

The PLA is considered a tool for maintaining power that is not under state or constitutional control, but rather under party control. Thus, the Leninist legacy is present in Chinese politics through the restriction of the military's political activity and the suppression of armed forces mobilizations contrary to the party's leadership. Aiming to contain any dissent within the military apparatus, the CCP combines the construction of ideological unity with the constant purging of individuals considered opponents, leading to the renewal of the PLA.

Two events that well represent the stifling of insurgent initiatives in the military establishment are the Lin Biao incident and the case of General Xu Qinxian. In 1971, faced with Mao Zedong's suspicions that his Minister of Defense and successor to the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao, was preparing a coup d'état called Project 571, Lin's family fled to the Soviet Union. However, the plane never reached its destination due to a crash in Mongolia that victimized everyone on board. The episode was interpreted by the Party leadership as an attempt at military usurpation of party authority, and all of Lin's influence in the People's Liberation Army was purged. In 1989, refusing to suppress pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square, Xu Qinxian was removed from command of the 38th Army Group and court-martialed on the grounds that he had threatened the stability of the Party by suggesting the adoption of formal political measures, such as legislation, to contain the crisis. At the conclusion of the trial, Xu was sentenced to five years in prison.  

The most recent purges gained greater prominence in 2022, and since then, approximately 100 high-ranking officers have been removed from their posts or disappeared from the institutional scene. The dismissals are a central part of China's preparations to deal with external conflicts by eliminating risks at home. The Chinese Communist Party's reinvigorated control over the People's Liberation Army is necessary for structuring a military force capable of defending Chinese interests in the 21st century, especially with regard to Taiwan, and ensuring Xi Jinping's absolute personal security.