The Crisis in the Strait of Hormuz Prompts Gulf Countries to Seek Alternative Routes

The chokepoint at the Strait of Hormuz, exacerbated by the military escalation involving Iran, the United States, and Israel over the past few months, has prompted Gulf countries to strategically seek alternative routes for exporting oil and natural gas. Under normal circumstances, the strait accounts for approximately one-quarter of global maritime oil trade and about 20% of liquefied natural gas (LNG), and has become a symbol of the structural vulnerability of the global energy economy. Faced with a significant reduction in maritime traffic in the region, major Middle Eastern exporters have begun to accelerate logistics projects that were previously considered complementary or secondary.

Saudi Arabia is the most advanced example of an attempt to bypass the strait. The country has expanded the use of the East-West pipeline (Petroline), which connects the Persian Gulf oil fields to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea. Following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, approximately 77% of Saudi oil exports began to be routed through Yanbu, demonstrating the growth of this alternative. Even with expanded capacity, however, the pipeline cannot fully replace the volume exported through Hormuz.

The United Arab Emirates has also developed important alternatives, particularly the pipeline connecting the oil fields to the port of Fujairah, located in the Gulf of Oman, outside the strait. This route reduces vulnerability to Iranian control over Hormuz. However, the alternative terminals themselves remain exposed to military attacks and regional instability, highlighting that the problem of energy security does not disappear entirely.

In this context, countries such as Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain face severe constraints due to the current situation. Iraq, for example, has once again become partially dependent on the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline, which connects its oil fields to the Turkish port on the Mediterranean, but the system’s operational capacity remains limited due to political instability, internal disputes, and frequent attacks. Furthermore, Iraq has also announced new pipeline projects linking Basra to Syria and Turkey, although such initiatives require billions in investment and years of construction. Meanwhile, Kuwait and Bahrain rank among the most vulnerable in the region because they have virtually no viable export alternatives outside the Strait of Hormuz, leading to a sharp decline in their exports and growing pressure on public finances.

Although the current stage of development of alternative oil and gas export routes by Gulf countries has partially reduced dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, these routes are still far from rendering it irrelevant. This is especially true given Iran’s historical attempts to expand its influence over the strait and use its strategic position as a tool for political and economic pressure. Although countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, and Iran have invested in pipelines and ports outside the strait, these facilities do not have sufficient capacity to completely replace the global flow of oil. Currently, Hormuz remains one of the main export hubs for oil and natural gas from the Gulf, which does not mean, however, that countries cannot benefit from new routes.

In addition to the pipelines already in operation, several Gulf countries have begun investing in multimodal solutions to reduce immediate export losses. Iran, for example, has intensified the use of rail corridors targeting the Asian market, especially toward China, integrating its energy infrastructure with Eurasian continental routes. In addition, the country has also expanded the use of the Jask oil terminal, located in the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz chokepoint. Although such initiatives represent significant strategic advances, experts point out that land transport of oil and petroleum products remains significantly more expensive and less efficient than large-scale maritime transport. As a result, a significant portion of regional production remains bottlenecked, putting pressure on economies highly dependent on oil revenues.

At the same time, the crisis has also intensified debates on international energy security and the diversification of global supply chains. Asian importers, particularly China, India, Japan, and South Korea, have begun seeking alternative suppliers and expanding their strategic reserves in response to instability in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, international organizations warn that the world’s current dependence on vulnerable maritime corridors exposes deep vulnerabilities in the globalized economy. In this context, infrastructure projects developed by Gulf countries have ceased to be merely national economic initiatives and have come to occupy a central position in contemporary geopolitical disputes, transforming oil pipelines, ports, and railways into important mechanisms of power and international influence.

The countries that benefit most from these new routes tend to be those with energy diversification strategies to access maritime outlets outside the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the main beneficiaries, as they are able to maintain a significant portion of their exports even in crisis scenarios, such as in the case of the Strait of Hormuz. Oman and Turkey also benefit due to their strategic geographic locations.

Therefore, although the Strait of Hormuz remains indispensable to the global energy market, the development of alternative routes demonstrates a growing effort by Gulf countries to reduce their dependence on one of the most vulnerable and strategic points in the international system.