Russia and China Expand Relations by Signing 40 Cooperation Agreements in Beijing

While China and the United States struggle to reconcile their interests in the realm of international trade, bilateral relations between the “Asian giant” and Russia, on the other hand, appear to be moving toward a well-established partnership, sparking the interest of global actors due to the breadth of their scope. The Putin-Xi Summit, held on May 20, marked a milestone for Russia-China ties, amid celebrations of the 25th anniversary of the first treaty signed between the countries in 2001. Putin’s visit to Beijing came shortly after the meeting between Trump and Xi in China to address complex issues such as the island of Taiwan.

In a spirit of cooperation, the summit provided a conducive environment for deepening the relationship. Approximately 40 bilateral agreements were signed, covering the fields of energy, artificial intelligence and technological innovation, trade, finance, and infrastructure, with the aim of aligning the development agendas of both countries. In this regard, President Vladimir Putin stated that the talks were very constructive, focusing the arguments in favor of the agreements on “deepening economic cooperation” between Russia and China. In line with Putin, Xi declared that China-Russia relations “have reached a new milestone” with this meeting, highlighting the high potential of cooperation for mutual economic prosperity.

In terms of trade relations, there is a growing trend in trade between these countries, which exceeded $240 billion last year, while in the first four months of 2026 alone it has already expanded by 20%. China remains Russia’s largest trading partner, building on a 16-year partnership that involves Moscow’s exports of energy, raw materials, and agricultural products, while imports of Chinese machinery, vehicles, electronics, and consumer goods into Russia are growing.

This rapprochement is imperative for Russia’s economic stability, given the series of sanctions imposed by Western powers since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, which prevent effective interdependence with these countries, particularly in the technological sphere. Furthermore, the energy advantages offered to China through the import of oil and natural gas from Russia have increased rapidly due to two key factors. The first relates to the launch of the “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline in 2019, which contributed to a significant expansion in gas exports to China, and the second refers to the declaration of a “no-limits” partnership between the two countries, made in 2022.

It is also worth noting that Russian-Chinese financial integration has caused quite a stir in Europe and the U.S., given the reduced use of Western currencies in bilateral trade and transactions as a result of this integration, which threatens the dollar’s financial hegemony and the euro’s relevance. Moscow asserts that this decision represents the formation of a more resilient front in opposition to external pressures and sanctions imposed by Western powers. Furthermore, Beijing has been reducing its holdings of U.S. Treasury securities in an effort to achieve greater financial autonomy from Washington.

The strengthening of the partnership goes beyond simple bilateral action, as it arises from coordination promoted among other actors in the international system. In this context, the BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the G20, and the UN Security Council also play a crucial role in the expansion of the network of multilateral cooperation projects, which promise to shield these countries from external pressures while contributing to the construction of a multipolar international order.

The discourse of multipolarity was very much present at the May 20 summit between Putin and Xi, materializing through a joint statement signed by the Russian and Chinese powers on that occasion. The document reaffirms the two countries’ commitment to ensuring a stable global balance of power and improving relations within the international system, guided by the ideals historically presented in recent joint statements issued by the Russia-China partnership.

In light of this, Russia and China recognize the significant influence of emerging and developing nations, challenging the Western hegemonic stance by favoring a polycentric view of the international system in the face of the dangers of international fragmentation. Furthermore, Russia and China strongly condemn the recent attacks by the U.S. and Israel on Iran as violations of international law that threaten stability in the Middle East.

The declaration, therefore, draws attention by calling for a “more rational system of global governance” based on four fundamental principles that the entire international community must adhere to: opening the world to inclusive and mutually beneficial cooperation; indivisibility and equitable security; democratization of international relations and improvement of the global governance system; and the diversity of global values and civilizations. According to the document, these principles serve to ensure a new type of order and relationship among countries, with the aim of establishing a global agenda focused on development and peace, based on multipolarity.

In the attempt to establish international relations based on justice, respect, equity, and mutually beneficial cooperation, a contrast is evident between the Moscow-Beijing relationship and that between the U.S. and China. This is because the United States tends to prioritize negotiations always grounded in a contest of power, unlike Russia, which adopts a stance of equality and respect when engaging with China. Thus, the United States’ constant thirst for hegemony becomes the greatest obstacle to potential progress in negotiations with Beijing, both in terms of trade and joint development.

Overcoming the “Western fence” has thus become a priority on the agenda of discussions between Russia and China, which, in addition to mutually benefiting from the agreements signed, inspire other emerging powers with their spirit of cooperation. The U.S. fear regarding the growing power of the BRICS bloc in the international system does not seem, from this point on, so unfounded, given the risks associated with the loss of its hegemony over those countries upon which it previously imposed its will with greater “ease.”

In early May, the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, paid a visit to Moscow at the invitation of Russian President Vladimir Putin, in the context of the celebrations marking the 80th anniversary of the victory in World War II. Days later, Putin was invited to Beijing by Xi, and the outcomes of these diplomatic visits sent an important political message to the world, particularly to the United States.

In a joint statement on global strategic stability, China and Russia assert that states must reject what they call the “Cold War mentality and zero-sum games,” seeking instead to “resolve contradictions through dialogue.” Beijing and Moscow share concerns regarding the “Golden Dome for America,” a U.S. missile defense shield inspired by Israel’s Iron Dome that involves the use of satellites capable of intercepting missiles from space. According to the statement, Donald Trump’s project “transforms outer space into an environment for the deployment of weapons and an arena for armed conflict.” The Sino-Russian perception, according to experts, is that this project poses a threat to the nuclear balance among the major powers.

China and Russia also intend to expand their cooperation in military technologies and artificial intelligence, against the backdrop of the Sino-American technological rivalry. Furthermore, the countries criticized recent U.S. actions on the international stage and declared their commitment to “an independent and sovereign foreign policy,” playing an important stabilizing role on the global stage as “responsible world powers.”

This year marks the 30th anniversary of the strategic partnership and cooperation between China and Russia and the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation between the two countries. But their relations are based much more on a pragmatic alignment than on a full-fledged alliance. The countries share geography, opposition to Western hegemony, and a partially overlapping strategic agenda, but the partnership has its limits. Excessive dependence on Russian energy is a cause for concern in Beijing, and its broader global ambitions continue to impose limits on how far the relationship can evolve.

China and Russia share one of the world’s longest land borders, stretching approximately 4,300 km, and occupy the same strategic space in Eurasia, which makes the costs of prolonged hostilities significantly high. This geographical logic is even more relevant given the polarization of the international system, in a context where Beijing and Moscow recognize the importance of coordinating actions against Western hegemony. For Russia, China offers a way out of isolation and a chance to maintain geopolitical relevance at a time when Russian relations with the West remain deeply strained.

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, China has provided Russia with significant economic resources, expanded bilateral trade, increased purchases of Russian gas and oil, and maintained technological and industrial exchanges—thereby straining its relations with Europe. In turn, Russia has offered China discounted energy supplies, military cooperation, and diplomatic support on issues such as Taiwan and criticism of NATO’s intentions in Asia.

With the reduction in Russian energy imports to Europe, China has become Russia’s most important long-term energy customer. But Beijing approaches these trade relations with caution, taking advantage of Russia’s weakened negotiating position to demand favorable prices and supply terms. Chinese policymakers have spent years diversifying energy sources in the Middle East, Central Asia, and global LNG markets to avoid geo-energy dependence. Thus, Beijing understands that over-reliance on a single supplier creates vulnerabilities, and even its stable relations with Russia do not mitigate the unnecessary strategic risk.

Furthermore, China and Russia do not share all of their geopolitical priorities. Although both seek to challenge U.S. hegemony, Beijing remains more deeply integrated into the global economy, and the costs of prolonged instability are much higher for it than for Moscow. China seeks political influence through controlled interdependence with its trading partners and rivals, while Russia seeks to gain an advantage by exploiting critical points of global tension.

Thus, at a time when the United States appears to be increasingly abandoning the model of the liberal international order it created, China and Russia are emerging as alternative powers through rhetoric that strategically revives multilateralism and stability. But the Sino-Russian partnership is not defined in terms of a permanent alliance: there is a careful calculation behind the cooperation between countries primarily concerned with their own autonomy and risks of vulnerability.