Rapprochement or Breakup? Meeting between Putin and Pashinyan Exposes the Fragility of the Russia-Armenia Alliance

At the recent meeting between Vladimir Putin and Nikol Pashinyan, the incompatibility between Armenia’s potential integration into the European Union (EU) and its continued membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) was reiterated. As Putin pointed out, Armenia “is developing relations with the European Union, and that does not concern us, but it is obviously impossible to be a member of both the EU and the EAEU at the same time.” Pashinyan acknowledged this incompatibility, admitting that, at the moment, he is trying to reconcile the two axes, combining his participation in the EAEU while simultaneously developing cooperation with the EU.

In practice, Armenia currently enjoys significant economic benefits within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). For example, Russia supplies natural gas to Armenia for about $177.50 per 1,000 m³, compared to European prices above $600 per 1,000 m³. Furthermore, according to official data, Armenian exports to EAEU countries have grown by about 12.5 times since 2015, while exports to the EU increased by only 1.5 times over the same period. These figures illustrate Armenia’s current strong trade integration into the Moscow-led economic space, in contrast to much smaller gains in the European and American markets.

A potential shift toward the EU would, however, entail considerable economic costs. Experts warn that withdrawal from the EAEU and a move away from the Russian market would bring severe economic and social consequences that not even the support of the European Union could offset. At present, Armenia is seeking to maintain energy subsidies from Russia. Armenian Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan stated that the price of Russian gas is unlikely to rise, given that Armenia plays a significant role for the EAEU. Armenian officials have warned that if Moscow were to raise tariffs, Armenia could withdraw from the EAEU (and even from the Collective Security Treaty Organization)—though they insistently rule out such a scenario. Thus, the dilemma lies in the fact that, without a free trade agreement with the European Union, Armenia remains heavily dependent on its ties with Russia. Full integration into the EU would mean losing the current preferential energy and trade regime—which, according to trade data, has tangibly benefited the Armenian economy. For now, Armenia maintains its Eurasian alignment while exploring cooperation with Brussels, aware that, in the future, Armenian citizens will have to decide which path to follow.

The speaker of the Armenian parliament, Alen Simonyan, on the other hand, stated that Armenia will leave the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) if Russia raises the price of gas supplied to the country. However, he added that he did not believe it would be necessary to take such a step, since the Prime Minister of Armenia and the President of Russia had a very productive conversation.

As for the CSTO, it consists of an intergovernmental military alliance comprising several former Soviet republics, established in 1992 and led by Russia. The organization aims to ensure regional stability, political-military coordination, and the principle of collective defense. Similar to NATO’s approach, the CSTO also enshrines the principle of collective defense. Thus, all members are expected to provide military assistance to one another in the event of external aggression, as an attack against one member state is considered an attack against all.

With this in mind, it is possible to understand Armenia’s reservations regarding its continued membership in the CSTO. Armenia’s main criticisms of the CSTO are based on its inability to maintain collective security. From Armenia’s perspective, the organization failed at crucial moments during the 2022 conflict with Azerbaijan, when cross-border attacks occurred on recognized Armenian territory. Consequently, Armenia invoked Article 4 of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in the hope of obtaining military support, but received only diplomatic responses. The CSTO, for its part, refused to intervene directly and sent only an observation mission. The rift deepened further in 2023, when Azerbaijan launched an offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh and, even with peacekeeping troops in the region, Russia did not intervene. Russia’s inaction contributed to the occupation of the territory and led to the forced displacement of more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians.

Given this scenario, Armenia came to realize that it could no longer rely on Russia to guarantee its security. Consequently, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan declared the alliance insufficient and began seeking closer ties with the West. It is understood that the CSTO’s lack of response facilitated Azerbaijan’s actions and accelerated Armenia’s distancing from Moscow. Armenia has also suspended its participation in the CSTO since 2024 and stopped paying contributions to the organization. Formally, Armenia has not withdrawn, although Pashinyan stated in December 2024 that, in essence, they already considered themselves outside the CSTO.

Regarding his stance on the lack of action in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, Putin stated that the alliance had no obligation to intervene in Nagorno-Karabakh, as its function is to protect member states against external aggression, which did not occur directly against Armenia. He pointed out that Armenia itself did not recognize Karabakh as part of its territory, which reinforces the lack of a legal basis for CSTO action. Despite the tensions and Armenia’s symbolic absence from the organization, Putin stated that the country had not officially left the alliance and could resume full participation, also emphasizing that each state has the right to define its own security policy. However, the Russian president warned that Armenia’s rapprochement with the European Union poses a real risk of a rupture with Eurasian integration for Armenia.

This scenario is also reflected in the 2026 parliamentary elections, which mark the first regular election since 2017. This period was marked by political crises and significant impacts from the 2020 war with Azerbaijan and the conflicts that escalated in the following years. The dispute is characterized by polarization between Nikol Pashinyan’s government and traditional elites, as well as divergent views on security and foreign policy. The political landscape is highly polarized, with opposition linked to former leaders and new actors. Foreign policy is a central issue: society is divided between alignment with the West, with Russia, or a balanced position. This debate intensifies in the recent context of tensions with Moscow and the meeting between Putin and Pashinyan, which highlights the redefinition of bilateral relations and directly influences the electoral debate.

The 2026 elections will thus be decisive in testing Armenia’s democratic stability and defining its geopolitical positioning, especially regarding the balance between Russia and the West.